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Treason, No. 1 / No Treason,
No. 2 / No Treason, No. 6

No Treason, No. 6

By rbarnett - Posted on 04 August
2009

NO TREASON

NO. VI.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY

I.

The Constitution has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no authority
or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and man. And it does not
so much as even purport to be a contract between persons now existing. It
purports, at most, to be only a contract between persons living eighty years
ago. And it can be supposed to have been a contract then only between persons
who had already come to years of discretion, so as to be competent to make
reasonable and obligatory contracts. Furthermore, we know, historically, that
only a small portion even of the people then existing were consulted on the
subject, or asked, or permitted to express either their consent or dissent in
any formal manner. Those persons, if any, who did give their consent formally,
are all dead now. Most of them have been dead forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy
years. And the constitution, so far as it was their contract, died with them.
They had no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their children. It
is not only plainly impossible, in the nature of things, that they could bind
their posterity, but they did not even attempt to bind them. That is to say, the
instrument does not purport to be an agreement between any body but "the people"
then existing; nor does it, either ex- [*4] pressly or impliedly, assert any
right, power, or disposition, on their part, to bind anybody but themselves. Let
us see. Its language is:

"We, the people of the United States (that is, the people then existing in
the United States), in order to form a more perfect union, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

It is plain, in the first place, that this language, as an agreement,
purports to be only what it at most really was, viz., a contract between the
people then existing; and, of necessity, binding, as a contract, only upon those
then existing. In the second place, the language neither expresses nor implies
that they had any right or power, to bind their "posterity" to live under it. It
does not say that their "posterity" will, shall, or must live under it. It only
says, in effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that it might
prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by promoting their
union, safety, tranquility, liberty, etc.

Suppose an agreement were entered into, in this form:

We, the people of Boston, agree to maintain a fort on Governor's Island, to
protect ourselves and our posterity against invasion.

This agreement, as an agreement, would clearly bind nobody but the people
then existing. Secondly, it would assert no right, power, or disposition, on
their part, to compel, their "posterity" to maintain such a fort. It would only
indicate that the supposed welfare of their posterity was one of the motives
that induced the original parties to enter into the agreement.

When a man says he is building a house for himself and his posterity, he does
not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of binding them, nor
is it to be inferred that he [*5] is so foolish as to imagine that he has any
right or power to bind them, to live in it. So far as they are concerned, he
only means to be understood as saying that his hopes and motives, in building
it, are that they, or at least some of them, may find it for their happiness to
live in it.

So when a man says he is planting a tree for himself and his posterity, he
does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of compelling
them, nor is it to be inferred that he is such a simpleton as to imagine that he
has any right or power to compel them, to eat the fruit. So far as they are
concerned, he only means to say that his hopes and motives, in planting the
tree, are that its fruit may be agreeable to them.

So it was with those who originally adopted the Constitution. Whatever may
have been their personal intentions, the legal meaning of their language, so far
as their "posterity" was concerned, simply was, that their hopes and motives, in
entering into the agreement, were that it might prove useful and acceptable to
their posterity; that it might promote their union, safety, tranquility, and
welfare; and that it might tend "to secure to them the blessings of liberty."
The language does not assert nor at all imply, any right, power, or disposition,
on the part of the original parties to the agreement, to compel their
"posterity" to live under it. If they had intended to bind their posterity to
live under it, they should have said that their objective was, not "to secure to
them the blessings of liberty," but to make slaves of them; for if their
"posterity" are bound to live under it, they are nothing less than the slaves of
their foolish, tyrannical, and dead grandfathers.

It cannot be said that the Constitution formed "the people of the United
States," for all time, into a corporation. It does not speak of "the people" as
a corporation, but as individuals. A corporation does not describe itself as
"we," nor as "people," nor as "ourselves." Nor does a corporation, in legal
language, [*6] have any "posterity." It supposes itself to have, and speaks of
itself as having, perpetual existence, as a single individuality.

Moreover, no body of men, existing at any one time, have the power to create
a perpetual corporation. A corporation can become practically perpetual only by
the voluntary accession of new members, as the old ones die off. But for this
voluntary accession of new members, the corporation necessarily dies with the
death of those who originally composed it.

Legally speaking, therefore, there is, in the Constitution, nothing that
professes or attempts to bind the "posterity" of those who establish[ed] it.

If, then, those who established the Constitution, had no power to bind, and
did not attempt to bind, their posterity, the question arises, whether their
posterity have bound themselves. If they have done so, they can have done so in
only one or both of these two ways, viz., by voting, and paying taxes.

II.

Let us consider these two matters, voting and tax paying, separately. And
first of voting.

All the voting that has ever taken place under the Constitution, has been of
such a kind that it not only did not pledge the whole people to support the
Constitution, but it did not even pledge any one of them to do so, as the
following considerations show.

1. In the very nature of things, the act of voting could bind nobody but the
actual voters. But owing to the property qualifications required, it is probable
that, during the first twenty or thirty years under the Constitution, not more
than one-tenth, fifteenth, or perhaps twentieth of the whole population (black
and white, men, women, and minors) were permitted to vote. Consequently, so far
as voting was concerned, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or twentieth of
those then existing, could have incurred any obligation to support the
Constitution. [*7]

At the present time, it is probable that not more than one-sixth of the whole
population are permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as voting is concerned,
the other five-sixths can have given no pledge that they will support the
Constitution.

2. Of the one-sixth that are permitted to vote, probably not more than
two-thirds (about one-ninth of the whole population) have usually voted. Many
never vote at all. Many vote only once in two, three, five, or ten years, in
periods of great excitement.

No one, by voting, can be said to pledge himself for any longer period than
that for which he votes. If, for example, I vote for an officer who is to hold
his office for only a year, I cannot be said to have thereby pledged myself to
support the government beyond that term. Therefore, on the ground of actual
voting, it probably cannot be said that more than one-ninth or one-eighth, of
the whole population are usually under any pledge to support the
Constitution.

3. It cannot be said that, by voting, a man pledges himself to support the
Constitution, unless the act of voting be a perfectly voluntary one on his part.
Yet the act of voting cannot properly be called a voluntary one on the part of
any very large number of those who do vote. It is rather a measure of necessity
imposed upon them by others, than one of their own choice. On this point I
repeat what was said in a former number, viz.:

"In truth, in the case of individuals, their actual voting is not to be taken
as proof of consent, even for the time being. On the contrary, it is to be
considered that, without his consent having even been asked a man finds himself
environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him to
pay money, render service, and forego the exercise of many of his natural
rights, under peril of weighty punishments. He sees, too, that other men
practice this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that,
if he will but use the ballot [*8] himself, he has some chance of relieving
himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to his own. In short, he
finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he use the ballot, he
may become a master; if he does not use it, he must become a slave. And he has
no other alternative than these two. In self-defence, he attempts the former.
His case is analogous to that of a man who has been forced into battle, where he
must either kill others, or be killed himself. Because, to save his own life in
battle, a man takes the lives of his opponents, it is not to be inferred that
the battle is one of his own choosing. Neither in contests with the ballot ---
which is a mere substitute for a bullet --- because, as his only chance of self-
preservation, a man uses a ballot, is it to be inferred that the contest is one
into which he voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his own
natural rights, as a stake against those of others, to be lost or won by the
mere power of numbers. On the contrary, it is to be considered that, in an
exigency into which he had been forced by others, and in which no other means of
self-defence offered, he, as a matter of necessity, used the only one that was
left to him.

"Doubtless the most miserable of men, under the most oppressive government in
the world, if allowed the ballot, would use it, if they could see any chance of
thereby meliorating their condition. But it would not, therefore, be a
legitimate inference that the government itself, that crushes them, was one
which they had voluntarily set up, or even consented to. "Therefore, a man's
voting under the Constitution of the United States, is not to be taken as
evidence that he ever freely assented to the Constitution, even for the time
being. Consequently we have no proof that any very large portion, even of the
actual voters of the United States, ever really and voluntarily consented to the
Constitution, even for the time being. Nor can we ever have such proof, until
every man is left perfectly free to consent, or not, without thereby subjecting
himself or his property to be disturbed or injured by others."

As we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who from
the necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal knowledge, as to any
particular individual, that he voted from choice; or, consequently, that by
voting, he consented, or pledged himself, to support the government. Legally
[*9] speaking, therefore, the act of voting utterly fails to pledge any one to
support the government. It utterly fails to prove that the government rests upon
the voluntary support of anybody. On general principles of law and reason, it
cannot be said that the government has any voluntary supporters at all, until it
can be distinctly shown who its voluntary supporters are.

4. As taxation is made compulsory on all, whether they vote or not, a large
proportion of those who vote, no doubt do so to prevent their own money being
used against themselves; when, in fact, they would have gladly abstained from
voting, if they could thereby have saved themselves from taxation alone, to say
nothing of being saved from all the other usurpations and tyrannies of the
government. To take a man's property without his consent, and then to infer his
consent because he attempts, by voting, to prevent that property from being used
to his injury, is a very insufficient proof of his consent to support the
Constitution. It is, in fact, no proof at all. And as we can have no legal
knowledge as to who the particular individuals are, if there are any, who are
willing to be taxed for the sake of voting, we can have no legal knowledge that
any particular individual consents to be taxed for the sake of voting; or,
consequently, consents to support the Constitution.

5. At nearly all elections, votes are given for various candidates for the
same office. Those who vote for the unsuccessful candidates cannot properly be
said to have voted to sustain the Constitution. They may, with more reason, be
supposed to have voted, not to support the Constitution, but specially to
prevent the tyranny which they anticipate the successful candidate intends to
practice upon them under color of the Constitution; and therefore may reasonably
be supposed to have voted against the Constitution itself. This supposition is
the more reasonable, inasmuch as such voting is the only mode allowed to them of
expressing their dissent to the Constitution. [*10]

6. Many votes are usually given for candidates who have no prospect of
success. Those who give such votes may reasonably be supposed to have voted as
they did, with a special intention, not to support, but to obstruct the
execution of, the Constitution; and, therefore, against the Constitution
itself.

7. As all the different votes are given secretly (by secret ballot), there is
no legal means of knowing, from the votes themselves, who votes for, and who
votes against, the Constitution. Therefore, voting affords no legal evidence
that any particular individual supports the Constitution. And where there can be
no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the Constitution, it
cannot legally be said that anybody supports it. It is clearly impossible to
have any legal proof of the intentions of large numbers of men, where there can
be no legal proof of the intentions of any particular one of them.

8. There being no legal proof of any man's intentions, in voting, we can only
conjecture them. As a conjecture, it is probable, that a very large proportion
of those who vote, do so on this principle, viz., that if, by voting, they could
but get the government into their own hands (or that of their friends), and use
its powers against their opponents, they would then willingly support the
Constitution; but if their opponents are to have the power, and use it against
them, then they would not willingly support the Constitution.

In short, men's voluntary support of the Constitution is doubtless, in most
cases, wholly contingent upon the question whether, by means of the
Constitution, they can make themselves masters, or are to be made slaves.

Such contingent consent as that is, in law and reason, no consent at all.

9. As everybody who supports the Constitution by voting (if there are any
such) does so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid all personal
responsibility for the acts of his agents or representatives, it cannot legally
or reasonably be [*11] said that anybody at all supports the Constitution by
voting. No man can reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as assent
to, or support, the Constitution, unless he does it openly, and in a way to make
himself personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so long as they act
within the limits of the power he delegates to them.

10. As all voting is secret (by secret ballot), and as all secret governments
are necessarily only secret bands of robbers, tyrants, and murderers, the
general fact that our government is practically carried on by means of such
voting, only proves that there is among us a secret band of robbers, tyrants,
and murderers, whose purpose is to rob, enslave, and, so far as necessary to
accomplish their purposes, murder, the rest of the people. The simple fact of
the existence of such a band does nothing towards proving that "the people of
the United States," or any one of them, voluntarily supports the
Constitution.

For all the reasons that have now been given, voting furnishes no legal
evidence as to who the particular individuals are (if there are any), who
voluntarily support the Constitution. It therefore furnishes no legal evidence
that anybody supports it voluntarily.

So far, therefore, as voting is concerned, the Constitution, legally
speaking, has no supporters at all.

And, as a matter of fact, there is not the slightest probability that the
Constitution has a single bona fide supporter in the country. That is to say,
there is not the slightest probability that there is a single man in the
country, who both understands what the Constitution really is, and sincerely
supports it for what it really is.

The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible supporters
of most other governments, are made up of three classes, viz.: 1. Knaves, a
numerous and active class, who see in the government an instrument which they
can use for their own aggrandizement or wealth. 2. Dupes --- a large class, no
[*12] doubt --- each of whom, because he is allowed one voice out of millions in
deciding what he may do with his own person and his own property, and because he
is permitted to have the same voice in robbing, enslaving, and murdering others,
that others have in robbing, enslaving, and murdering himself, is stupid enough
to imagine that he is a "free man," a "sovereign"; that this is "a free
government"; "a government of equal rights," "the best government on earth,"
and such like absurdities. 3. A class who have some appreciation of the
evils of government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not
choose to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give themselves
seriously and earnestly to the work of making a change.

III.

The payment of taxes, being compulsory, of course furnishes no evidence that
any one voluntarily supports the Constitution.

1. It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid
voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily
entered into by the people with each other; that that each man makes a free and
purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to the Constitution,
to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with any other
insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to
pay tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected.

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical
fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: Your
money, or your life." And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion
of that threat.

The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon
him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol [*13] to his head, proceed to rifle
his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it
is far more dastardly and shameful.

The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and
crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your
money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to
be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be
merely a "protector," and that he takes men's money against their will, merely
to enable him to "protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able
to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection.
He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having
taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in
following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful
"sovereign," on account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep
"protecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you
to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often
as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a
rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without
mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a
gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these.
In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either
his dupe or his slave.

The proceedings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves "the
government," are directly the opposite of these of the single highwayman.

In the first place, they do not, like him, make themselves individually
known; or, consequently, take upon themselves personally the responsibility of
their acts. On the contrary, they secretly (by secret ballot) designate some one
of their number [*14] to commit the robbery in their behalf, while they keep
themselves practically concealed. They say to the person thus designated:

Go to A_____ B_____, and say to him that "the government" has need of money
to meet the expenses of protecting him and his property. If he presumes to say
that he has never contracted with us to protect him, and that he wants none of
our protection, say to him that that is our business, and not his; that we
choose to protect him, whether he desires us to do so or not; and that we demand
pay, too, for protecting him. If he dares to inquire who the individuals are,
who have thus taken upon themselves the title of "the government," and who
assume to protect him, and demand payment of him, without his having ever made
any contract with them, say to him that that, too, is our business, and not his;
that we do not choose to make ourselves individually known to him; that we have
secretly (by secret ballot) appointed you our agent to give him notice of our
demands, and, if he complies with them, to give him, in our name, a receipt that
will protect him against any similar demand for the present year. If he refuses
to comply, seize and sell enough of his property to pay not only our demands,
but all your own expenses and trouble beside. If he resists the seizure of his
property, call upon the bystanders to help you (doubtless some of them will
prove to be members of our band.) If, in defending his property, he should kill
any of our band who are assisting you, capture him at all hazards; charge him
(in one of our courts) with murder; convict him, and hang him. If he should call
upon his neighbors, or any others who, like him, may be disposed to resist our
demands, and they should come in large numbers to his assistance, cry out that
they are all rebels and traitors; that "our country" is in danger; call upon the
commander of our hired murderers; tell him to quell the rebellion and "save the
country," cost what it may. Tell him to kill all who resist, though they should
be hundreds of thou- [*15] sands; and thus strike terror into all others
similarly disposed. See that the work of murder is thoroughly done; that we may
have no further trouble of this kind hereafter. When these traitors shall have
thus been taught our strength and our determination, they will be good loyal
citizens for many years, and pay their taxes without a why or a wherefore.

It is under such compulsion as this that taxes, so called, are paid. And how
much proof the payment of taxes affords, that the people consent to "support the
government," it needs no further argument to show.

2. Still another reason why the payment of taxes implies no consent, or
pledge, to support the government, is that the taxpayer does not know, and has
no means of knowing, who the particular individuals are who compose "the
government." To him "the government" is a myth, an abstraction, an
incorporeality, with which he can make no contract, and to which he can give no
consent, and make no pledge. He knows it only through its pretended agents. "The
government" itself he never sees. He knows indeed, by common report, that
certain persons, of a certain age, are permitted to vote; and thus to make
themselves parts of, or (if they choose) opponents of, the government, for the
time being. But who of them do thus vote, and especially how each one votes
(whether so as to aid or oppose the government), he does not know; the voting
being all done secretly (by secret ballot). Who, therefore, practically compose
"the government," for the time being, he has no means of knowing. Of course he
can make no contract with them, give them no consent, and make them no pledge.
Of necessity, therefore, his paying taxes to them implies, on his part, no
contract, consent, or pledge to support them --- that is, to support "the
government," or the Constitution.

3. Not knowing who the particular individuals are, who call themselves "the
government," the taxpayer does not know whom he pays his taxes to. All he knows
is that a man comes to [*16] him, representing himself to be the agent of "the
government" --- that is, the agent of a secret band of robbers and murderers,
who have taken to themselves the title of "the government," and have determined
to kill everybody who refuses to give them whatever money they demand. To save
his life, he gives up his money to this agent. But as this agent does not make
his principals individually known to the taxpayer, the latter, after he has
given up his money, knows no more who are "the government" --- that is, who were
the robbers --- than he did before. To say, therefore, that by giving up his
money to their agent, he entered into a voluntary contract with them, that he
pledges himself to obey them, to support them, and to give them whatever money
they should demand of him in the future, is simply ridiculous.

4. All political power, so called, rests practically upon this matter of
money. Any number of scoundrels, having money enough to start with, can
establish themselves as a "government"; because, with money, they can hire
soldiers, and with soldiers extort more money; and also compel general obedience
to their will. It is with government, as Caesar said it was in war, that money
and soldiers mutually supported each other; that with money he could hire
soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. So these villains, who call themselves
governments, well understand that their power rests primarily upon money. With
money they can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. And, when their
authority is denied, the first use they always make of money, is to hire
soldiers to kill or subdue all who refuse them more money.

For this reason, whoever desires liberty, should understand these vital
facts, viz.: 1. That every man who puts money into the hands of a "government"
(so called), puts into its hands a sword which will be used against him, to
extort more money from him, and also to keep him in subjection to its arbitrary
will. 2. That those who will take his money, without his con- [*17] sent, in the
first place, will use it for his further robbery and enslavement, if he presumes
to resist their demands in the future. 3. That it is a perfect absurdity to
suppose that any body of men would ever take a man's money without his consent,
for any such object as they profess to take it for, viz., that of protecting
him; for why should they wish to protect him, if he does not wish them to do so?
To suppose that they would do so, is just as absurd as it would be to suppose
that they would take his money without his consent, for the purpose of buying
food or clothing for him, when he did not want it. 4. If a man wants
"protection," he is competent to make his own bargains for it; and nobody has
any occasion to rob him, in order to "protect" him against his will. 5. That the
only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in their
keeping their money in their own pockets, until they have assurances, perfectly
satisfactory to themselves, that it will be used as they wish it to be used, for
their benefit, and not for their injury. 6. That no government, so called, can
reasonably be trusted for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have honest
purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support.

These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot reasonably
be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a "government," for the
purpose of securing its protection, unless he first make an explicit and purely
voluntary contract with it for that purpose.

It is perfectly evident, therefore, that neither such voting, nor such
payment of taxes, as actually takes place, proves anybody's consent, or
obligation, to support the Constitution. Consequently we have no evidence at all
that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that anybody is under any
contract or obligation whatever to support it. And nobody is under any
obligation to support it. [*18]

IV.

The constitution not only binds nobody now, but it never did bind anybody. It
never bound anybody, because it was never agreed to by anybody in such a manner
as to make it, on general principles of law and reason, binding upon him.

It is a general principle of law and reason, that a written instrument binds
no one until he has signed it. This principle is so inflexible a one, that even
though a man is unable to write his name, he must still "make his mark," before
he is bound by a written contract. This custom was established ages ago, when
few men could write their names; when a clerk --- that is, a man who could write
--- was so rare and valuable a person, that even if he were guilty of high
crimes, he was entitled to pardon, on the ground that the public could not
afford to lose his services. Even at that time, a written contract must be
signed; and men who could not write, either "made their mark," or signed their
contracts by stamping their seals upon wax affixed to the parchment on which
their contracts were written. Hence the custom of affixing seals, that has
continued to this time.

The laws holds, and reason declares, that if a written instrument is not
signed, the presumption must be that the party to be bound by it, did not choose
to sign it, or to bind himself by it. And law and reason both give him until the
last moment, in which to decide whether he will sign it, or not. Neither law nor
reason requires or expects a man to agree to an instrument, until it is written;
for until it is written, he cannot know its precise legal meaning. And when it
is written, and he has had the opportunity to satisfy himself of its precise
legal meaning, he is then expected to decide, and not before, whether he will
agree to it or not. And if he do not then sign it, his reason is supposed to be,
that he does not choose to enter into such a contract. The fact that the
instrument was written for him to sign, or with the hope that he would sign it,
goes for nothing. [*19]

Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could bring into
court a written instrument, without any signature, and claim to have it
enforced, upon the ground that it was written for another man to sign? that this
other man had promised to sign it? that he ought to have signed it? that he had
had the opportunity to sign it, if he would? but that he had refused or
neglected to do so? Yet that is the most that could ever be said of the
Constitution. The very judges, who profess to derive all their authority
from the Constitution --- from an instrument that nobody ever signed --- would
spurn any other instrument, not signed, that should be brought before them for
adjudication.

Moreover, a written instrument must, in law and reason, not only be signed,
but must also be delivered to the party (or to some one for him), in whose favor
it is made, before it can bind the party making it. The signing is of no effect,
unless the instrument be also delivered. And a party is at perfect liberty to
refuse to deliver a written instrument, after he has signed it. The Constitution
was not only never signed by anybody, but it was never delivered by anybody, or
to anybody's agent or attorney. It can therefore be of no more validity as a
contract, then can any other instrument that was never signed or delivered.

V.

As further evidence of the general sense of mankind, as to the practical
necessity there is that all men's important contracts, especially those of a
permanent nature, should be both written and signed, the following facts are
pertinent. [*20]

For nearly two hundred years --- that is, since 1677 --- there has been on
the statute book of England, and the same, in substance, if not precisely in
letter, has been re-enacted, and is now in force, in nearly or quite all the
States of this Union, a statute, the general object of which is to declare that
no action shall be brought to enforce contracts of the more important class,
unless they are put in writing, and signed by the parties to be held chargeable
upon them.

The principle of the statute, be it observed, is, not merely that written
contracts shall be signed, but also that all con- [*21] tracts, except for those
specially exempted --- generally those that are for small amounts, and are to
remain in force for but a short time --- shall be both written and signed.

The reason of the statute, on this point, is, that it is now so easy a thing
for men to put their contracts in writing, and sign them, and their failure to
do so opens the door to so much doubt, fraud, and litigation, that men who
neglect to have their contracts --- of any considerable importance --- written
and signed, ought not to have the benefit of courts of justice to enforce them.
And this reason is a wise one; and that experience has confirmed its wisdom and
necessity, is demonstrated by the fact that it has been acted upon in England
for nearly two hundred years, and has been so nearly universally adopted in this
country, and that nobody thinks of repealing it.

We all know, too, how careful most men are to have their contracts written
and signed, even when this statute does not require it. For example, most men,
if they have money due them, of no larger amount than five or ten dollars, are
careful to take a note for it. If they buy even a small bill of goods, paying
for it at the time of delivery, they take a receipted bill for it. If they pay a
small balance of a book account, or any other small debt previously contracted,
they take a written receipt for it.

Furthermore, the law everywhere (probably) in our country, as well as in
England, requires that a large class of contracts, such as wills, deeds, etc.,
shall not only be written and signed, but also sealed, witnessed, and
acknowledged. And in the case of married women conveying their rights in real
estate, the law, in many States, requires that the women shall be examined
separate and apart from their husbands, and declare that they sign their
contracts free of any fear or compulsion of their husbands.

Such are some of the precautions which the laws require, and which
individuals --- from motives of common prudence, even in cases not required by
law --- take, to put their contracts in writing, and have them signed, and, to
guard against all uncertainties [*22] and controversies in regard to their
meaning and validity. And yet we have what purports, or professes, or is
claimed, to be a contract --- the Constitution --- made eighty years ago, by men
who are now all dead, and who never had any power to bind us, but which (it is
claimed) has nevertheless bound three generations of men, consisting of many
millions, and which (it is claimed) will be binding upon all the millions that
are to come; but which nobody ever signed, sealed, delivered, witnessed, or
acknowledged; and which few persons, compared with the whole number that are
claimed to be bound by it, have ever read, or even seen, or ever will read, or
see. And of those who ever have read it, or ever will read it, scarcely any two,
perhaps no two, have ever agreed, or ever will agree, as to what it means.

Moreover, this supposed contract, which would not be received in any court of
justice sitting under its authority, if offered to prove a debt of five dollars,
owing by one man to another, is one by which --- as it is generally interpreted
by those who pretend to administer it --- all men, women and children throughout
the country, and through all time, surrender not only all their property, but
also their liberties, and even lives, into the hands of men who by this supposed
contract, are expressly made wholly irresponsible for their disposal of them.
And we are so insane, or so wicked, as to destroy property and lives without
limit, in fighting to compel men to fulfill a supposed contract, which, inasmuch
as it has never been signed by anybody, is, on general principles of law and
reason --- such principles as we are all governed by in regard to other
contracts --- the merest waste of paper, binding upon nobody, fit only to be
thrown into the fire; or, if preserved, preserved only to serve as a witness and
a warning of the folly and wickedness of mankind.

VI.

It is no exaggeration, but a literal truth, to say that, by the Constitution
--- not as I interpret it, but as it is interpreted by those [*23] who pretend
to administer it --- the properties, liberties, and lives of the entire people
of the United States are surrendered unreservedly into the hands of men who, it
is provided by the Constitution itself, shall never be "questioned" as to any
disposal they make of them.

Thus the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 6) provides that, "for any speech or
debate [or vote,] in either house, they [the senators and representatives] shall
not be questioned in any other place."

The whole law-making power is given to these senators and representatives
[when acting by a two-thirds vote] ; and this provision protects them from
all responsibility for the laws they make.

The Constitution also enables them to secure the execution of all their laws,
by giving them power to withhold the salaries of, and to impeach and remove, all
judicial and executive officers, who refuse to execute them.

Thus the whole power of the government is in their hands, and they are made
utterly irresponsible for the use they make of it. What is this but absolute,
irresponsible power?

It is no answer to this view of the case to say that these men are under oath
to use their power only within certain limits; for what care they, or what
should they care, for oaths or limits, when it is expressly provided, by the
Constitution itself, that they shall never be "questioned," or held to any
responsibility whatever, for violating their oaths, or transgressing those
limits?

Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the men holding
this absolute, irresponsible power, must be men chosen by the people (or
portions of them) to hold it. A man is none the less a slave because he is
allowed to choose a new master once in a term of years. Neither are a people any
the less slaves because permitted periodically to choose new masters. What makes
them slaves is the fact that they now are, and are always hereafter to be, in
the hands of men whose power over them is, and always is to be, absolute and
irresponsible. [*24]

The right of absolute and irresponsible dominion is the right of property,
and the right of property is the right of absolute, irresponsible dominion. The
two are identical; the one necessarily implies the other. Neither can exist
without the other. If, therefore, Congress have that absolute and irresponsible
law-making power, which the Constitution --- according to their interpretation
of it --- gives them, it can only be because they own us as property. If they
own us as property, they are our masters, and their will is our law. If they do
not own us as property, they are not our masters, and their will, as such, is of
no authority over us.

But these men who claim and exercise this absolute and irresponsible dominion
over us, dare not be consistent, and claim either to be our masters, or to own
us as property. They say they are only our servants, agents, attorneys, and
representatives. But this declaration involves an absurdity, a contradiction. No
man can be my servant, agent, attorney, or representative, and be, at the same
time, uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me for his acts. It is of no
importance that I appointed him, and put all power in his hands. If I made him
uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me, he is no longer my servant,
agent, attorney, or representative. If I gave him absolute, irre- [*25]
sponsible power over my property, I gave him the property. If I gave him
absolute, irresponsible power over myself, I made him my master, and gave myself
to him as a slave. And it is of no importance whether I called him master or
servant, agent or owner. The only question is, what power did I put in his
hands? Was it an absolute and irresponsible one? or a limited and responsible
one?

For still another reason they are neither our servants, agents, attorneys,
nor representatives. And that reason is, that we do not make ourselves
responsible for their acts. If a man is my servant, agent, or attorney, I
necessarily make myself responsible for all his acts done within the limits of
the power I have intrusted to him. If I have intrusted him, as my agent, with
either absolute power, or any power at all, over the persons or properties of
other men than myself, I thereby necessarily make myself responsible to those
other persons for any injuries he may do them, so long as he acts within the
limits of the power I have granted him. But no individual who may be injured in
his person or property, by acts of Congress, can come to the individual
electors, and hold them responsible for these acts of their so-called agents or
representatives. This fact proves that these pretended agents of the people, of
everybody, are really the agents of nobody.

If, then, nobody is individually responsible for the acts of Congress, the
members of Congress are nobody's agents. And if they are nobody's agents, they
are themselves individually responsible for their own acts, and for the acts of
all whom they employ. And the authority they are exercising is simply their own
individual authority; and, by the law of nature --- the highest of all laws ---
anybody injured by their acts, anybody who is deprived by them of his property
or his liberty, has the same right to hold them individually responsible, that
he has to hold any other trespasser individually responsible. He has the same
right [*26] to resist them, and their agents, that he has to resist any other
trespassers.

VII.

It is plain, then, that on general principles of law and reason --- such
principles as we all act upon in courts of justice and in common life --- the
Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody;
and that all those who pretend to act by its authority, are really acting
without any legitimate authority at all; that, on general principles of law and
reason, they are mere usurpers, and that everybody not only has the right, but
is morally bound, to treat them as such.

If the people of this country wish to maintain such a government as the
Constitution describes, there is no reason in the world why they should not sign
the instrument itself, and thus make known their wishes in an open, authentic
manner; in such manner as the common sense and experience of mankind have shown
to be reasonable and necessary in such cases; and in such manner as to make
themselves (as they ought to do) individually responsible for the acts of the
government. But the people have never been asked to sign it. And the only reason
why they have never been asked to sign it, has been that it has been known that
they never would sign it; that they were neither such fools nor knaves as they
must needs have been to be willing to sign it; that (at least as it has been
practically interpreted) it is not what any sensible and honest man wants for
himself; nor such as he has any right to impose upon others. It is, to all moral
intents and purposes, as destitute of obligations as the compacts which robbers
and thieves and pirates enter into with each other, but never sign.

If any considerable number of the people believe the Constitution to be good,
why do they not sign it themselves, and make laws for, and administer them upon,
each other; leaving all [*27] other persons (who do not interfere with them) in
peace? Until they have tried the experiment for themselves, how can they have
the face to impose the Constitution upon, or even to recommend it to, others?
Plainly the reason for absurd and inconsistent conduct is that they want the
Constitution, not solely for any honest or legitimate use it can be of to
themselves or others, but for the dishonest and illegitimate power it gives them
over the persons and properties of others. But for this latter reason, all their
eulogiums on the Constitution, all their exhortations, and all their
expenditures of money and blood to sustain it, would be wanting.

VIII.

The Constitution itself, then, being of no authority, on what authority does
our government practically rest? On what ground can those who pretend to
administer it, claim the right to seize men's property, to restrain them of
their natural liberty of action, industry, and trade, and to kill all who deny
their authority to dispose of men's properties, liberties, and lives at their
pleasure or discretion?

The most they can say, in answer to this question, is, that some half,
two-thirds, or three-fourths, of the male adults of the country have a tacit
understanding that they will maintain a government under the Constitution; that
they will select, by ballot, the persons to administer it; and that those
persons who may receive a majority, or a plurality, of their ballots, shall act
as their representatives, and administer the Constitution in their name, and by
their authority.

But this tacit understanding (admitting it to exist) cannot at all justify
the conclusion drawn from it. A tacit understanding between A, B, and C, that
they will, by ballot, depute D as their agent, to deprive me of my property,
liberty, or life, cannot at all authorize D to do so. He is none the less a
robber, tyrant, and murderer, because he claims to act as their agent, [*28]
than he would be if he avowedly acted on his own responsibility alone.

Neither am I bound to recognize him as their agent, nor can he legitimately
claim to be their agent, when he brings no written authority from them
accrediting him as such. I am under no obligation to take his word as to who his
principals may be, or whether he has any. Bringing no credentials, I have a
right to say he has no such authority even as he claims to have: and that he is
therefore intending to rob, enslave, or murder me on his own account.

This tacit understanding, therefore, among the voters of the country, amounts
to nothing as an authority to their agents. Neither do the ballots by which they
select their agents, avail any more than does their tacit understanding; for
their ballots are given in secret, and therefore in such a way as to avoid any
personal responsibility for the acts of their agents.

No body of men can be said to authorize a man to act as their agent, to the
injury of a third person, unless they do it in so open and authentic a manner as
to make themselves personally responsible for his acts. None of the voters in
this country appoint their political agents in any open, authentic manner, or in
any manner to make themselves responsible for their acts. Therefore these
pretended agents cannot legitimately claim to be really agents. Somebody must be
responsible for the acts of these pretended agents; and if they cannot show any
open and authentic credentials from their principals, they cannot, in law or
reason, be said to have any principals. The maxim applies here, that what does
not appear, does not exist. If they can show no principals, they have none.

But even these pretended agents do not themselves know who their pretended
principals are. These latter act in secret; for acting by secret ballot is
acting in secret as much as if they were to meet in secret conclave in the
darkness of the night. And they are personally as much unknown to the agents
they select, [*29] as they are to others. No pretended agent therefore can ever
know by whose ballots he is selected, or consequently who his real principles
are. Not knowing who his principles are, he has no right to say that he has any.
He can, at most, say only that he is the agent of a secret band of robbers and
murderers, who are bound by that faith which prevails among confederates in
crime, to stand by him, if his acts, done in their name, shall be resisted.

Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world, have no
occasion thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do acts for which they
(the principals) are not willing to be responsible.

The secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is a
secret band of robbers and murderers. Open despotism is better than this. The
single despot stands out in the face of all men, and says: I am the State: My
will is law: I am your master: I take the responsibility of my acts: The only
arbiter I acknowledge is the sword: If anyone denies my right, let him try
conclusions with me.

But a secret government is little less than a government of assassins. Under
it, a man knows not who his tyrants are, until they have struck, and perhaps not
then. He may guess, beforehand, as to some of his immediate neighbors. But he
really knows nothing. The man to whom he would most naturally fly for
protection, may prove an enemy, when the time of trial comes.

This is the kind of government we have; and it is the only one we are likely
to have, until men are ready to say: We will consent to no Constitution, except
such an one as we are neither ashamed nor afraid to sign; and we will authorize
no government to do anything in our name which we are not willing to be
personally responsible for. [*30]

IX.

What is the motive to the secret ballot? This, and only this: Like other
confederates in crime, those who use it are not friends, but enemies; and they
are afraid to be known, and to have their individual doings known, even to each
other. They can contrive to bring about a sufficient understanding to enable
them to act in concert against other persons; but beyond this they have no
confidence, and no friendship, among themselves. In fact, they are engaged quite
as much in schemes for plundering each other, as in plundering those who are not
of them. And it is perfectly well understood among them that the strongest party
among them will, in certain contingencies, murder each other by the hundreds of
thousands (as they lately did do) to accomplish their purposes against each
other. Hence they dare not be known, and have their individual doings known,
even to each other. And this is avowedly the only reason for the ballot: for a
secret government; a government by secret bands of robbers and murderers. And we
are insane enough to call this liberty! To be a member of this secret band of
robbers and murderers is esteemed a privilege and an honor! Without this
privilege, a man is considered a slave; but with it a free man! With it he is
considered a free man, because he has the same power to secretly (by secret
ballot) procure the robbery, enslavement, and murder of another man, and that
other man has to procure his robbery, enslavement, and murder. And this they
call equal rights!

If any number of men, many or few, claim the right to govern the people of
this country, let them make and sign an open compact with each other to do so.
Let them thus make themselves individually known to those whom they propose to
govern. And let them thus openly take the legitimate responsibility of their
acts. How many of those who now support the Constitution, will ever do this? How
many will ever dare openly pro- [*31] claim their right to govern? or take the
legitimate responsibility of their acts? Not one!

X.

It is obvious that, on general principles of law and reason, there exists no
such thing as a government created by, or resting upon, any consent, compact, or
agreement of "the people of the United States" with each other; that the only
visible, tangible, responsible government that exists, is that of a few
individuals only, who act in concert, and call themselves by the several names
of senators, representatives, presidents, judges, marshals, treasurers,
collectors, generals, colonels, captains, etc., etc.

On general principles of law and reason, it is of no importance whatever that
these few individuals profess to be the agents and representatives of "the
people of the United States"; since they can show no credentials from the people
themselves; they were never appointed as agents or representatives in any open,
authentic manner; they do not themselves know, and have no means of knowing, and
cannot prove, who their principals (as they call them) are individually; and
consequently cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals at
all.

It is obvious, too, that if these alleged principals ever did appoint these
pretended agents, or representatives, they appointed them secretly (by secret
ballot), and in a way to avoid all personal responsibility for their acts; that,
at most, these alleged principals put these pretended agents forward for the
most criminal purposes, viz.: to plunder the people of their property, and
restrain them of their liberty; and that the only authority that these alleged
principals have for so doing, is simply a tacit understanding among themselves
that they will imprison, shoot, or hang every man who resists the exactions and
restraints which their agents or representatives may impose upon them.

Thus it is obvious that the only visible, tangible government we [*32] have
is made up of these professed agents or representatives of a secret band of
robbers and murderers, who, to cover up, or gloss over, their robberies and
murders, have taken to themselves the title of "the people of the United
States"; and who, on the pretense of being "the people of the United States,"
assert their right to subject to their dominion, and to control and dispose of
at their pleasure, all property and persons found in the United States.

XI.

On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which these pretended
agents of the people take "to support the Constitution," are of no validity or
obligation. And why? For this, if for no other reason, viz., that they are given
to nobody. There is no privity (as the lawyers say) --- that is, no mutual
recognition, consent, and agreement --- between those who take these oaths, and
any other persons.

If I go upon Boston Common, and in the presence of a hundred thousand people,
men, women and children, with whom I have no contract upon the subject, take an
oath that I will enforce upon them the laws of Moses, of Lycurgus, of Solon, of
Justinian, or of Alfred, that oath is, on general principles of law and reason,
of no obligation. It is of no obligation, not merely because it is intrinsically
a criminal one, but also because it is given to nobody, and consequently pledges
my faith to nobody. It is merely given to the winds.

It would not alter the case at all to say that, among these hundred thousand
persons, in whose presence the oath was taken, there were two, three, or five
thousand male adults, who had secretly --- by secret ballot, and in a way to
avoid making themselves individually known to me, or to the remainder of the
hundred thousand --- designated me as their agent to rule, control, plunder,
and, if need be, murder, these hundred thousand [*33] people. The fact that they
had designated me secretly, and in a manner to prevent my knowing them
individually, prevents all privity between them and me; and consequently makes
it impossible that there can be any contract, or pledge of faith, on my part
towards them; for it is impossible that I can pledge my faith, in any legal
sense, to a man whom I neither know, nor have any means of knowing,
individually.

So far as I am concerned, then, these two, three, or five thousand persons
are a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have secretly, and in a way to
save themselves from all responsibility for my acts, designated me as their
agent; and have, through some other agent, or pretended agent, made their wishes
known to me. But being, nevertheless, individually unknown to me, and having no
open, authentic contract with me, my oath is, on general principles of law and
reason, of no validity as a pledge of faith to them. And being no pledge of
faith to them, it is no pledge of faith to anybody. It is mere idle wind. At
most, it is only a pledge of faith to an unknown band of robbers and murderers,
whose instrument for plundering and murdering other people, I thus publicly
confess myself to be. And it has no other obligation than a similar oath given
to any other unknown body of pirates, robbers, and murderers. For these reasons
the oaths taken by members of Congress, "to support the Constitution," are, on
general principles of law and reason, of no validity. They are not only criminal
in themselves, and therefore void; but they are also void for the further reason
that they are given to nobody.

It cannot be said that, in any legitimate or legal sense, they are given to
"the people of the United States"; because neither the whole, nor any large
proportion of the whole, people of the United States ever, either openly or
secretly, appointed or designated these men as their agents to carry the
Constitution into effect. The great body of the people --- that is, men, women,
and children --- were never asked, or even permitted, to signify, in any [*34]
formal manner, either openly or secretly, their choice or wish on the subject.
The most that these members of Congress can say, in favor of their appointment,
is simply this: Each one can say for himself:

I have evidence satisfactory to myself, that there exists, scattered
throughout the country, a band of men, having a tacit understanding with each
other, and calling themselves "the people of the United States," whose general
purposes are to control and plunder each other, and all other persons in the
country, and, so far as they can, even in neighboring countries; and to kill
every man who shall attempt to defend his person and property against their
schemes of plunder and dominion. Who these men are, individually, I have no
certain means of knowing, for they sign no papers, and give no open, authentic
evidence of their individual membership. They are not known individually even to
each other. They are apparently as much afraid of being individually known to
each other, as of being known to other persons. Hence they ordinarily have no
mode either of exercising, or of making known, their individual membership,
otherwise than by giving their votes secretly for certain agents to do their
will. But although these men are individually unknown, both to each other and to
other persons, it is generally understood in the country that none but male
persons, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, can be members. It is also
generally understood that all male persons, born in the country, having certain
complexions, and (in some localities) certain amounts of property, and (in
certain cases) even persons of foreign birth, are permitted to be members. But
it appears that usually not more than one half, two-thirds, or in some cases,
three-fourths, of all who are thus permitted to become members of the band, ever
exercise, or consequently prove, their actual membership, in the only mode in
which they ordinarily can exercise or prove it, viz., by giving their votes
secretly for the officers or agents of the band. The number of these secret
[*35] votes, so far as we have any account of them, varies greatly from year to
year, thus tending to prove that the band, instead of being a permanent
organization, is a merely pro tempore affair with those who choose to act with
it for the time being. The gross number of these secret votes, or what purports
to be their gross number, in different localities, is occasionally published.
Whether these reports are accurate or not, we have no means of knowing. It is
generally supposed that great frauds are often committed in depositing them.
They are understood to be received and counted by certain men, who are
themselves appointed for that purpose by the same secret process by which all
other officers and agents of the band are selected. According to the reports of
these receivers of votes (for whose accuracy or honesty, however, I cannot
vouch), and according to my best knowledge of the whole number of male persons
"in my district," who (it is supposed) were permitted to vote, it would appear
that one-half, two-thirds or three-fourths actually did vote. Who the men were,
individually, who cast these votes, I have no knowledge, for the whole thing was
done secretly. But of the secret votes thus given for what they call a "member
of Congress," the receivers reported that I had a majority, or at least a larger
number than any other one person. And it is only by virtue of such a designation
that I am now here to act in concert with other persons similarly selected in
other parts of the country. It is understood among those who sent me here, that
all persons so selected, will, on coming together at the City of Washington,
take an oath in each other's presence "to support the Constitution of the United
States." By this is meant a certain paper that was drawn up eighty years ago. It
was never signed by anybody, and apparently has no obligation, and never had any
obligation, as a contract. In fact, few persons ever read it, and doubtless much
the largest number of those who voted for me and the others, never even saw it,
or now pretend to know what it means. Nevertheless, it is often spoken [*36] of
in the country as "the Constitution of the United States"; and for some reason
or other, the men who sent me here, seem to expect that I, and all with whom I
act, will swear to carry this Constitution into effect. I am therefore ready to
take this oath, and to co-operate with all others, similarly selected, who are
ready to take the same oath.

This is the most that any member of Congress can say in proof that he has any
constituency; that he represents anybody; that his oath "to support the
Constitution," is given to anybody, or pledges his faith to anybody. He has no
open, written, or other authentic evidence, such as is required in all other
cases, that he was ever appointed the agent or representative of anybody. He has
no written power of attorney from any single individual. He has no such legal
knowledge as is required in all other cases, by which he can identify a single
one of those who pretend to have appointed him to represent them.

Of course his oath, professedly given to them, "to support the Constitution,"
is, on general principles of law and reason, an oath given to nobody. It pledges
his faith to nobody. If he fails to fulfil his oath, not a single person can
come forward, and say to him, you have betrayed me, or broken faith with me.

No one can come forward and say to him: I appointed you my attorney to act
for me. I required you to swear that, as my attorney, you would support the
Constitution. You promised me that you would do so; and now you have forfeited
the oath you gave to me. No single individual can say this.

No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, [*37] can come
forward and say to him: We appointed you our attorney, to act for us. We
required you to swear that, as our attorney, you would support the Constitution.
You promised us that you would do so; and now you have forfeited the oath you
gave to us.

No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can say this to
him; because there is no such association or body of men in existence. If any
one should assert that there is such an association, let him prove, if he can,
who compose it. Let him produce, if he can, any open, written, or other
authentic contract, signed or agreed to by these men; forming themselves into an
association; making themselves known as such to the world; appointing him as
their agent; and making themselves individually, or as an association,
responsible for his acts, done by their authority. Until all this can be shown,
no one can say that, in any legitimate sense, there is any such association; or
that he is their agent; or that he ever gave his oath to them; or ever pledged
his faith to them.

On general principles of law and reason, it would be a sufficient answer for
him to say, to all individuals, and to all pretended associations of
individuals, who should accuse him of a breach of faith to them:

I never knew you. Where is your evidence that you, either individually or
collectively, ever appointed me your attorney? that you ever required me to
swear to you, that, as your attorney, I would support the Constitution? or that
I have now broken any faith that I ever pledged to you? You may, or you may not,
be members of that secret band of robbers and murderers, who act in secret;
appoint their agents by a secret ballot; who keep themselves individually
unknown even to the agents they thus appoint; and who, therefore, cannot claim
that they have any agents; or that any of their pretended agents ever gave his
oath, or pledged his faith to them. I repudiate you altogether. My oath was
given to others, with whom you have nothing to do; or it was idle wind, given
only to the idle winds. Begone!

XII.

For the same reasons, the oaths of all the other pretended agents of this
secret band of robbers and murderers are, on [*38] general principles of law and
reason, equally destitute of obligation. They are given to nobody; but only to
the winds.

The oaths of the tax-gatherers and treasurers of the band, are, on general
principles of law and reason, of no validity. If any tax-gatherer, for example,
should put the money he receives into his own pocket, and refuse to part with
it, the members of this band could not say to him: You collected that money as
our agent, and for our uses; and you swore to pay it over to us, or to those we
should appoint to receive it. You have betrayed us, and broken faith with
us.

It would be a sufficient answer for him to say to them:

I never knew you. You never made yourselves individually known to me. I never
game by oath to you, as individuals. You may, or you may not, be members of that
secret band, who appoint agents to rob and murder other people; but who are
cautious not to make themselves individually known, either to such agents, or to
those whom their agents are commissioned to rob. If you are members of that
band, you have given me no proof that you ever commissioned me to rob others for
your benefit. I never knew you, as individuals, and of course never promised you
that I would pay over to you the proceeds of my robberies. I committed my
robberies on my own account, and for my own profit. If you thought I was fool
enough to allow you to keep yourselves concealed, and use me as your tool for
robbing other persons; or that I would take all the personal risk of the
robberies, and pay over the proceeds to you, you were particularly simple. As I
took all the risk of my robberies, I propose to take all the profits. Begone!
You are fools, as well as villains. If I gave my oath to anybody, I gave it to
other persons than you. But I really gave it to nobody. I only gave it to the
winds. It answered my purposes at the time. It enabled me to get the money I was
after, and now I propose to keep it. If you expected me to pay it over to you,
you relied only upon that honor [*39] that is said to prevail among thieves. You
now understand that that is a very poor reliance. I trust you may become wise
enough to never rely upon it again. If I have any duty in the matter, it is to
give back the money to those from whom I took it; not to pay it over to villains
such as you.

XIII.

On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which foreigners take, on
coming here, and being "naturalized" (as it is called), are of no validity. They
are necessarily given to nobody; because there is no open, authentic
association, to which they can join themselves; or to whom, as individuals, they
can pledge their faith. No such association, or organization, as "the people of
the United States," having ever been formed by any open, written, authentic, or
voluntary contract, there is, on general principles of law and reason, no such
association, or organization, in existence. And all oaths that purport to be
given to such an association are necessarily given only to the winds. They
cannot be said to be given to any man, or body of men, as individuals, because
no man, or body of men, can come forward with any proof that the oaths were
given to them, as individuals, or to any association of which they are members.
To say that there is a tacit understanding among a portion of the male adults of
the country, that they will call themselves "the people of the United States,"
and that they will act in concert in subjecting the remainder of the people of
the United States to their dominion; but that they will keep themselves
personally concealed by doing all their acts secretly, is wholly insufficient,
on general principles of law and reason, to prove the existence of any such
association, or organization, as "the people of the United States"; or
consequently to prove that the oaths of foreigners were given to any such
association. [*40]

XIV.

On general principles of law and reason, all the oaths which, since the war,
have been given by Southern men, that they will obey the laws of Congress,
support the Union, and the like, are of no validity. Such oaths are invalid, not
only because they were extorted by military power, and threats of confiscation,
and because they are in contravention of men's natural right to do as they
please about supporting the government, but also because they were given to
nobody. They were nominally given to "the United States." But being nominally
given to "the United States," they were necessarily given to nobody, because, on
general principles of law and reason, there were no "United States," to whom the
oaths could be given. That is to say, there was no open, authentic, avowed,
legitimate association, corporation, or body of men, known as "the United
States," or as "the people of the United States," to whom the oaths could have
been given. If anybody says there was such a corporation, let him state who were
the individuals that composed it, and how and when they became a corporation.
Were Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C members of it? If so, where are their signatures?
Where the evidence of their membership? Where the record? Where the open,
authentic proof? There is none. Therefore, in law and reason, there was no such
corporation.

On general principles of law and reason, every corporation, association, or
organized body of men, having a legitimate corporate existence, and legitimate
corporate rights, must consist of certain known individuals, who can prove, by
legitimate and reasonable evidence, their membership. But nothing of this kind
can be proved in regard to the corporation, or body of men, who call themselves
"the United States." Not a man of them, in all the Northern States, can prove by
any legitimate evidence, such as is required to prove membership in other legal
corporations, that he himself, or any other man whom he can name, is [*41] a
member of any corporation or association called "the United States," or "the
people of the United States," or, consequently, that there is any such
corporation. And since no such corporation can be proved to exist, it cannot of
course be proved that the oaths of Southern men were given to any such
corporation. The most that can be claimed is that the oaths were given to a
secret band of robbers and murderers, who called themselves "the United States,"
and extorted those oaths. But that is certainly not enough to prove that the
oaths are of any obligation.

XV.

On general principles of law and reason, the oaths of soldiers, that they
will serve a given number of years, that they will obey the the orders of their
superior officers, that they will bear true allegiance to the government, and so
forth, are of no obligation. Independently of the criminality of an oath, that,
for a given number of years, he will kill all whom he may be commanded to kill,
without exercising his own judgment or conscience as to the justice or necessity
of such killing, there is this further reason why a soldier's oath is of no
obligation, viz., that, like all the other oaths that have now been mentioned,
it is given to nobody. There being, in no legitimate sense, any such
corporation, or nation, as "the United States," nor, consequently, in any
legitimate sense, any such government as "the government of the United States,"
a soldier's oath given to, or contract made with, such a nation or government,
is necessarily an oath given to, or contract made with, nobody. Consequently
such an oath or contract can be of no obligation.

XVI.

On general principles of law and reason, the treaties, so called, which
purport to be entered into with other nations, [*42] by persons calling
themselves ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators of the United
States, in the name, and in behalf, of "the people of the United States," are of
no validity. These so-called ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators,
who claim to be the agents of "the people of the United States" for making these
treaties, can show no open, written, or other authentic evidence that either the
whole "people of the United States," or any other open, avowed, responsible body
of men, calling themselves by that name, ever authorized these pretended
ambassadors and others to make treaties in the name of, or binding upon any one
of, "the people of the United States," or any other open, avowed, responsible
body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever authorized these pretended
ambassadors, secretaries, and others, in their name and behalf, to recognize
certain other persons, calling themselves emperors, kings, queens, and the like,
as the rightful rulers, sovereigns, masters, or representatives of the different
peoples whom they assume to govern, to represent, and to bind.

The "nations," as they are called, with whom our pretended ambassadors,
secretaries, presidents, and senators profess to make treaties, are as much
myths as our own. On general principles of law and reason, there are no such
"nations." That is to say, neither the whole people of England, for example, nor
any open, avowed, responsible body of men, calling themselves by that name,
ever, by any open, written, or other authentic contract with each other, formed
themselves into any bona fide, legitimate association or organization, or
authorized any king, queen, or other representative to make treaties in their
name, or to bind them, either individually, or as an association, by such
treaties.

Our pretended treaties, then, being made with no legitimate or bona fide
nations, or representatives of nations, and being [*43] made, on our part, by
persons who have no legitimate authority to act for us, have intrinsically no
more validity than a pretended treaty made by the Man in the Moon with the king
of the Pleiades.

XVII.

On general principles of law and reason, debts contracted in the name of "the
United States," or of "the people of the United States," are of no validity. It
is utterly absurd to pretend that debts to the amount of twenty-five hundred
millions of dollars are binding upon thirty-five or forty millions of people,
when there is not a particle of legitimate evidence --- such as would be
required to prove a private debt --- that can be produced against any one of
them, that either he, or his properly authorized attorney, ever contracted to
pay one cent.

Certainly, neither the whole people of the United States, nor any number of
them, ever separately or individually contracted to pay a cent of these
debts.

Certainly, also, neither the whole people of the United States, nor any
number of them, every, by any open, written, or other authentic and voluntary
contract, united themselves as a firm, corporation, or association, by the name
of "the United States," or "the people of the United States," and authorized
their agents to contract debts in their name.

Certainly, too, there is in existence no such firm, corporation, or
association as "the United States," or "the people of the United States," formed
by any open, written, or other authentic and voluntary contract, and having
corporate property with which to pay these debts.

How, then, is it possible, on any general principle of law or reason, that
debts that are binding upon nobody individually, can be binding upon forty
millions of people collectively, when, on general and legitimate principles of
law and reason, these [*43] forty millions of people neither have, nor ever had,
any corporate property? never made any corporate or individual contract? and
neither have, nor ever had, any corporate existence?

Who, then, created these debts, in the name of "the United States"? Why, at
most, only a few persons, calling themselves "members of Congress," etc., who
pretended to represent "the people of the United States," but who really
represented only a secret band of robbers and murderers, who wanted money to
carry on the robberies and murders in which they were then engaged; and who
intended to extort from the future people of the United States, by robbery and
threats of murder (and real murder, if that should prove necessary), the means
to pay these debts.

This band of robbers and murderers, who were the real principals in
contracting these debts, is a secret one, because its members have never entered
into any open, written, avowed, or authentic contract, by which they may be
individually known to the world, or even to each other. Their real or pretended
representatives, who contracted these debts in their name, were selected (if
selected at all) for that purpose secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to
furnish evidence against none of the principals individually; and these
principals were really known individually neither to their pretended
representatives who contracted these debts in their behalf, nor to those who
lent the money. The money, therefore, was all borrowed and lent in the dark;
that is, by men who did not see each other's faces, or know each other's names;
who could not then, and cannot now, identify each other as principals in the
transactions; and who consequently can prove no contract with each other.

Furthermore, the money was all lent and borrowed for criminal purposes; that
is, for purposes of robbery and murder; and for this reason the contracts were
all intrinsically void; and would have been so, even though the real parties,
borrowers and [*45] lenders, had come face to face, and made their contracts
openly, in their own proper names.

Furthermore, this secret band of robbers and murderers, who were the real
borrowers of this money, having no legitimate corporate existence, have no
corporate property with which to pay these debts. They do indeed pretend to own
large tracts of wild lands, lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and
between the Gulf of Mexico and the North Pole. But, on general principles of law
and reason, they might as well pretend to own the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
themselves; or the atmosphere and the sunlight; and to hold them, and dispose of
them, for the payment of these debts.

Having no corporate property with which to pay what purports to be their
corporate debts, this secret band of robbers and murderers are really bankrupt.
They have nothing to pay with. In fact, they do not propose to pay their debts
otherwise than from the proceeds of their future robberies and murders. These
are confessedly their sole reliance; and were known to be such by the lenders of
the money, at the time the money was lent. And it was, therefore, virtually a
part of the contract, that the money should be repaid only from the proceeds of
these future robberies and murders. For this reason, if for no other, the
contracts were void from the beginning.

In fact, these apparently two classes, borrowers and lenders, were really one
and the same class. They borrowed and lent money from and to themselves. They
themselves were not only part and parcel, but the very life and soul, of this
secret band of robbers and murderers, who borrowed and spent the money.
Individually they furnished money for a common enterprise; taking, in return,
what purported to be corporate promises for individual loans. The only excuse
they had for taking these so-called corporate promises of, for individual loans
by, the same parties, was that they might have some apparent excuse for the
future robberies of the band (that is, to pay the debts of [*46] the
corporation), and that they might also know what shares they were to be
respectively entitled to out of the proceeds of their future robberies.

Finally, if these debts had been created for the most innocent and honest
purposes, and in the most open and honest manner, by the real parties to the
contracts, these parties could thereby have bound nobody but themselves, and no
property but their own. They could have bound nobody that should have come after
them, and no property subsequently created by, or belonging to, other
persons.

XVIII.

The Constitution having never been signed by anybody; and there being no
other open, written, or authentic contract between any parties whatever, by
virtue of which the United States government, so called, is maintained; and it
being well known that none but male persons, of twenty-one years of age and
upwards, are allowed any voice in the government; and it being also well known
that a large number of these adult persons seldom or never vote at all; and that
all those who do vote, do so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to
prevent their individual votes being known, either to the world, or even to each
other; and consequently in a way to make no one openly responsible for the acts
of their agents, or representatives, --- all these things being known, the
questions arise: Who compose the real governing power in the country? Who are
the men, the responsible men, who rob us of our property? Restrain us of our
liberty? Subject us to their arbitrary dominion? And devastate our homes, and
shoot us down by the hundreds of thousands, if we resist? How shall we find
these men? How shall we know them from others? How shall we defend ourselves and
our property against them? Who, of our neighbors, are members of this secret
band of robbers and murderers? How [*47] can we know which are their houses,
that we may burn or demolish them? Which their property, that we may destroy it?
Which their persons, that we may kill them, and rid the world and ourselves of
such tyrants and monsters?

These are questions that must be answered, before men can be free; before
they can protect themselves against this secret band of robbers and murderers,
who now plunder, enslave, and destroy them.

The answer to these questions is, that only those who have the will and power
to shoot down their fellow men, are the real rulers in this, as in all other
(so-called) civilized countries; for by no others will civilized men be robbed,
or enslaved.

Among savages, mere physical strength, on the part of one man, may enable him
to rob, enslave, or kill another man. Among barbarians, mere physical strength,
on the part of a body of men, disciplined, and acting in concert, though with
very little money or other wealth, may, under some circumstances, enable them to
rob, enslave, or kill another body of men, as numerous, or perhaps even more
numerous, than themselves. And among both savages and barbarians, mere want may
sometimes compel one man to sell himself as a slave to another. But with
(so-called) civilized peoples, among whom knowledge, wealth, and the means of
acting in concert, have become diffused; and who have invented such weapons and
other means of defense as to render mere physical strength of less importance;
and by whom soldiers in any requisite number, and other instrumentalities of war
in any requisite amount, can always be had for money, the question of war, and
consequently the question of power, is little else than a mere question of
money. As a necessary consequence, those who stand ready to furnish this money,
are the real rulers. It is so in Europe, and it is so in this country.

In Europe, the nominal rulers, the emperors and kings and parliaments, are
anything but the real rulers of their respective countries. They are little or
nothing else than mere tools, em- [*48] ployed by the wealthy to rob, enslave,
and (if need be) murder those who have less wealth, or none at all.

The Rothschilds, and that class of money-lenders of whom they are the
representatives and agents --- men who never think of lending a shilling to
their next-door neighbors, for purposes of honest industry, unless upon the most
ample security, and at the highest rate of interest --- stand ready, at all
times, to lend money in unlimited amounts to those robbers and murderers, who
call themselves governments, to be expended in shooting down those who do not
submit quietly to being robbed and enslaved.

They lend their money in this manner, knowing that it is to be expended in
murdering their fellow men, for simply seeking their liberty and their rights;
knowing also that neither the interest nor the principal will ever be paid,
except as it will be extorted under terror of the repetition of such murders as
those for which the money lent is to be expended.

These money-lenders, the Rothschilds, for example, say to themselves: If we
lend a hundred millions sterling to the queen and parliament of England, it will
enable them to murder twenty, fifty, or a hundred thousand people in England,
Ireland, or India; and the terror inspired by such wholesale slaughter, will
enable them to keep the whole people of those countries in subjection for
twenty, or perhaps fifty, years to come; to control all their trade and
industry; and to extort from them large amounts of money, under the name of
taxes; and from the wealth thus extorted from them, they (the queen and
parliament) can afford to pay us a higher rate of interest for our money than we
can get in any other way. Or, if we lend this sum to the emperor of Austria, it
will enable him to murder so many of his people as to strike terror into the
rest, and thus enable him to keep them in subjection, and extort money from
them, for twenty or fifty years to come. And they say the same in regard to the
emperor of Russia, the king of Prussia, the emperor of France, [*49] or any
other ruler, so called, who, in their judgment, will be able, by murdering a
reasonable portion of his people, to keep the rest in subjection, and extort
money from them, for a long time to come, to pay the interest and the principal
of the money lent him.

And why are these men so ready to lend money for murdering their fellow men?
Soley for this reason, viz., that such loans are considered better investments
than loans for purposes of honest industry. They pay higher rates of interest;
and it is less trouble to look after them. This is the whole matter.

The question of making these loans is, with these lenders, a mere question of
pecuniary profit. They lend money to be expended in robbing, enslaving, and
murdering their fellow men, solely because, on the whole, such loans pay better
than any others. They are no respecters of persons, no superstitious fools, that
reverence monarchs. They care no more for a king, or an emperor, than they do
for a beggar, except as he is a better customer, and can pay them better
interest for their money. If they doubt his ability to make his murders
successful for maintaining his power, and thus extorting money from his people
in future, they dismiss him unceremoniously as they would dismiss any other
hopeless bankrupt, who should want to borrow money to save himself from open
insolvency.

When these great lenders of blood-money, like the Rothschilds, have loaned
vast sums in this way, for purposes of murder, to an emperor or a king, they
sell out the bonds taken by them, in small amounts, to anybody, and everybody,
who are disposed to buy them at satisfactory prices, to hold as investments.
They (the Rothschilds) thus soon get back their money, with great profits; and
are now ready to lend money in the same way again to any other robber and
murderer, called an emperor or king, who, they think, is likely to be successful
in his robberies and murders, and able to pay a good price for the money
necessary to carry them on. [*50]

This business of lending blood-money is one of the most thoroughly sordid,
cold-blooded, and criminal that was ever carried on, to any considerable extent,
amongst human beings. It is like lending money to slave traders, or to common
robbers and pirates, to be repaid out of their plunder. And the men who loan
money to governments, so called, for the purpose of enabling the latter to rob,
enslave, and murder their people, are among the greatest villains that the world
has ever seen. And they as much deserve to be hunted and killed (if they cannot
otherwise be got rid of) as any slave traders, robbers, or pirates that ever
lived.

When these emperors and kings, so-called, have obtained their loans, they
proceed to hire and train immense numbers of professional murderers, called
soldiers, and employ them in shooting down all who resist their demands for
money. In fact, most of them keep large bodies of these murderers constantly in
their service, as their only means of enforcing their extortions. There are now,
I think, four or five millions of these professional murderers constantly
employed by the so-called sovereigns of Europe. The enslaved people are, of
course, forced to support and pay all these murderers, as well as to submit to
all the other extortions which these murderers are employed to enforce.

It is only in this way that most of the so-called governments of Europe are
maintained. These so-called governments are in reality only great bands of
robbers and murderers, organized, disciplined, and constantly on the alert. And
the so-called sovereigns, in these different governments, are simply the heads,
or chiefs, of different bands of robbers and murderers. And these heads or
chiefs are dependent upon the lenders of blood-money for the means to carry on
their robberies and murders. They could not sustain themselves a moment but for
the loans made to them by these blood-money loan-mongers. And their first care
is to maintain their credit with them; for they know [*51] their end is come,
the instant their credit with them fails. Consequently the first proceeds of
their extortions are scrupulously applied to the payment of the interest on
their loans.

In addition to paying the interest on their bonds, they perhaps grant to the
holders of them great monopolies in banking, like the Banks of England, of
France, and of Vienna; with the agreement that these banks shall furnish money
whenever, in sudden emergencies, it may be necessary to shoot down more of their
people. Perhaps also, by means of tariffs on competing imports, they give great
monopolies to certain branches of industry, in which these lenders of
blood-money are engaged. They also, by unequal taxation, exempt wholly or
partially the property of these loan-mongers, and throw corresponding burdens
upon those who are too poor and weak to resist.

Thus it is evident that all these men, who call themselves by the
high-sounding names of Emperors, Kings, Sovereigns, Monarchs, Most Christian
Majesties, Most Catholic Majesties, High Mightinesses, Most Serene and Potent
Princes, and the like, and who claim to rule "by the grace of God," by "Divine
Right" --- that is, by special authority from Heaven --- are intrinsically not
only the merest miscreants and wretches, engaged solely in plundering,
enslaving, and murdering their fellow men, but that they are also the merest
hangers on, the servile, obsequious, fawning dependents and tools of these
blood-money loan-mongers, on whom they rely for the means to carry on their
crimes. These loan-mongers, like the Rothschilds, laugh in their sleeves, and
say to themselves: These despicable creatures, who call themselves emperors, and
kings, and majesties, and most serene and potent princes; who profess to wear
crowns, and sit on thrones; who deck themselves with ribbons, and feathers, and
jewels; and surround themselves with hired flatterers and lickspittles; and whom
we suffer to strut around, and palm themselves off, upon fools and slaves, as
sovereigns and lawgivers specially appointed by Almighty God; and to hold them-
[*52] selves out as the sole fountains of honors, and dignities, and wealth, and
power --- all these miscreants and imposters know that we make them, and use
them; that in us they live, move, and have their being; that we require them (as
the price of their positions) to take upon themselves all the labor, all the
danger, and all the odium of all the crimes they commit for our profit; and that
we will unmake them, strip them of their gewgaws, and send them out into the
world as beggars, or give them over to the vengeance of the people they have
enslaved, the moment they refuse to commit any crime we require of them, or to
pay over to us such share of the proceeds of their robberies as we see fit to
demand.

XIX.

Now, what is true in Europe, is substantially true in this country. The
difference is the immaterial one, that, in this country, there is no visible,
permanent head, or chief, of these robbers and murderers who call themselves
"the government." That is to say, there is no one man, who calls himself the
state, or even emperor, king, or sovereign; no one who claims that he and his
children rule "by the Grace of God," by "Divine Right," or by special
appointment from Heaven. There are only certain men, who call themselves
presidents, senators, and representatives, and claim to be the authorized
agents, for the time being, or for certain short periods, of all "the people of
the United States"; but who can show no credentials, or powers of attorney, or
any other open, authentic evidence that they are so; and who notoriously are not
so; but are really only the agents of a secret band of robbers and murderers,
whom they themselves do not know, and have no means of knowing, individually;
but who, they trust, will openly or secretly, when the crisis comes, sustain
them in all their usurpations and crimes.

What is important to be noticed is, that these so-called presidents,
senators, and representatives, these pretended agents of all "the people of the
United States," the moment their exactions [*53] meet with any formidable
resistance from any portion of "the people" themselves, are obliged, like their
co-robbers and murderers in Europe, to fly at once to the lenders of blood
money, for the means to sustain their power. And they borrow their money on the
same principle, and for the same purpose, viz., to be expended in shooting down
all those "people of the United States" --- their own constituents and
principals, as they profess to call them --- who resist the robberies and
enslavements which these borrowers of the money are practising upon them. And
they expect to repay the loans, if at all, only from the proceeds of the future
robberies, which they anticipate it will be easy for them and their successors
to perpetrate through a long series of years, upon their pretended principals,
if they can but shoot down now some hundreds of thousands of them, and thus
strike terror into the rest.

Perhaps the facts were never made more evident, in any country on the globe,
than in our own, that these soulless blood-money loan-mongers are the real
rulers; that they rule from the most sordid and mercenary motives; that the
ostensible government, the presidents, senators, and representatives, so called,
are merely their tools; and that no ideas of, or regard for, justice or liberty
had anything to do in inducing them to lend their money for the war. In proof of
all this, look at the following facts.

Nearly a hundred years ago we professed to have got rid of all that religious
superstition, inculcated by a servile and corrupt priesthood in Europe, that
rulers, so called, derived their authority directly from Heaven; and that it was
consequently a religious duty on the part of the people to obey them. We
professed long ago to have learned that governments could rightfully exist only
by the free will, and on the voluntary support, of those who might choose to
sustain them. We all professed to have known long ago, that the only legitimate
objects of government were the maintenance of liberty and justice equally for
all. All this [*54] we had professed for nearly a hundred years. And we
professed to look with pity and contempt upon those ignorant, superstitious, and
enslaved peoples of Europe, who were so easily kept in subjection by the frauds
and force of priests and kings.

Notwithstanding all this, that we had learned, and known, and professed, for
nearly a century, these lenders of blood money had, for a long series of years
previous to the war, been the willing accomplices of the slave-holders in
perverting the government from the purposes of liberty and justice, to the
greatest of crimes. They had been such accomplices for a purely pecuniary
consideration, to wit, a control of the markets in the South; in other words,
the privilege of holding the slave-holders themselves in industrial and
commercial subjection to the manufacturers and merchants of the North (who
afterwards furnished the money for the war). And these Northern merchants and
manufacturers, these lenders of blood-money, were willing to continue to be the
accomplices of the slave-holders in the future, for the same pecuniary
considerations. But the slave-holders, either doubting the fidelity of their
Northern allies, or feeling themselves strong enough to keep their slaves in
subjection without Northern assistance, would no longer pay the price which
these Northern men demanded. And it was to enforce this price in the future ---
that is, to monopolize the Southern markets, to maintain their industrial and
commercial control over the South --- that these Northern manufacturers and
merchants lent some of the profits of their former monopolies for the war, in
order to secure to themselves the same, or greater, monopolies in the future.
These --- and not any love of liberty or justice --- were the motives on which
the money for the war was lent by the North. In short, the North said to the
slave-holders: If you will not pay us our price (give us control of your
markets) for our assistance against your slaves, we will secure the same price
(keep control of your markets) by helping your slaves against you, and using
them as our tools for main- [*55] taining dominion over you; for the control of
your markets we will have, whether the tools we use for that purpose be black or
white, and be the cost, in blood and money, what it may.

On this principle, and from this motive, and not from any love of liberty, or
justice, the money was lent in enormous amounts, and at enormous rates of
interest. And it was only by means of these loans that the objects of the war
were accomplished.

And now these lenders of blood-money demand their pay; and the government, so
called, becomes their tool, their servile, slavish, villanous tool, to extort it
from the labor of the enslaved people both of the North and South. It is to be
extorted by every form of direct, and indirect, and unequal taxation. Not only
the nominal debt and interest --- enormous as the latter was --- are to be paid
in full; but these holders of the debt are to be paid still further --- and
perhaps doubly, triply, or quadruply paid --- by such tariffs on imports as will
enable our home manufacturers to realize enormous prices for their commodities;
also by such monopolies in banking as will enable them to keep control of, and
thus enslave and plunder, the industry and trade of the great body of the
Northern people themselves. In short, the industrial and commercial slavery of
the great body of the people, North and South, black and white, is the price
which these lenders of blood money demand, and insist upon, and are determined
to secure, in return for the money lent for the war.

This programme having been fully arranged and systematized, they put their
sword into the hands of the chief murderer of the war, and charge him to carry
their scheme into effect. And now he, speaking as their organ, says, "Let us
have peace."

The meaning of this is: Submit quietly to all the robbery and slavery we have
arranged for you, and you can have "peace." But in case you resist, the same
lenders of blood-money, who furnished the means to subdue the South, will
furnish the means again to subdue you. [*56]

These are the terms on which alone this government, or, with few exceptions,
any other, ever gives "peace" to its people.

The whole affair, on the part of those who furnished the money, has been, and
now is, a deliberate scheme of robbery and murder; not merely to monopolize the
markets of the South, but also to monopolize the currency, and thus control the
industry and trade, and thus plunder and enslave the laborers, of both North and
South. And Congress and the president are today the merest tools for these
purposes. They are obliged to be, for they know that their own power, as rulers,
so-called, is at an end, the moment their credit with the blood-money
loan-mongers fails. They are like a bankrupt in the hands of an extortioner.
They dare not say nay to any demand made upon them. And to hide at once, if
possible, both their servility and crimes, they attempt to divert public
attention, by crying out that they have "Abolished Slavery!" That they have
"Saved the Country!" That they have "Preserved our Glorious Union!" and that, in
now paying the "National Debt," as they call it (as if the people themselves,
all of them who are to be taxed for its payment, had really and voluntarily
joined in contracting it), they are simply "Maintaining the National Honor!"

By "maintaining the national honor," they mean simply that they themselves,
open robbers and murderers, assume to be the nation, and will keep faith with
those who lend them the money necessary to enable them to crush the great body
of the people under their feet; and will faithfully appropriate, from the
proceeds of their future robberies and murders, enough to pay all their loans,
principal and interest.

The pretense that the "abolition of slavery" was either a motive or
justification for the war, is a fraud of the same character with that of
"maintaining the national honor." Who, but such usurpers, robbers, and murderers
as they, ever established slavery? Or what government, except one resting upon
[*57] the sword, like the one we now have, was ever capable of maintaining
slavery? And why did these men abolish slavery? Not from any love of liberty in
general --- not as an act of justice to the black man himself, but only "as a
war measure," and because they wanted his assistance, and that of his friends,
in carrying on the war they had undertaken for maintaining and intensifying that
political, commercial, and industrial slavery, to which they have subjected the
great body of the people, both black and white. And yet these imposters now cry
out that they have abolished the chattel slavery of the black man --- although
that was not the motive of the war --- as if they thought they could thereby
conceal, atone for, or justify that other slavery which they were fighting to
perpetuate, and to render more rigorous and inexorable than it ever was before.
There was no difference of principle --- but only of degree --- between the
slavery they boast they have abolished, and the slavery they were fighting to
preserve; for all restraints upon men's natural liberty, not necessary for the
simple maintenance of justice, are of the nature of slavery, and differ from
each other only in degree.

If their object had really been to abolish slavery, or maintain liberty or
justice generally, they had only to say: All, whether white or black, who want
the protection of this government, shall have it; and all who do not want it,
will be left in peace, so long as they leave us in peace. Had they said this,
slavery would necessarily have been abolished at once; the war would have been
saved; and a thousand times nobler union than we have ever had would have been
the result. It would have been a voluntary union of free men; such a union as
will one day exist among all men, the world over, if the several nations, so
called, shall ever get rid of the usurpers, robbers, and murderers, called
governments, that now plunder, enslave, and destroy them.

Still another of the frauds of these men is, that they are now [*58]
establishing, and that the war was designed to establish, "a government of
consent." The only idea they have ever manifested as to what is a government of
consent, is this --- that it is one to which everybody must consent, or be shot.
This idea was the dominant one on which the war was carried on; and it is the
dominant one, now that we have got what is called "peace."

Their pretenses that they have "Saved the Country," and "Preserved our
Glorious Union," are frauds like all the rest of their pretenses. By them they
mean simply that they have subjugated, and maintained their power over, an
unwilling people. This they call "Saving the Country"; as if an enslaved and
subjugated people --- or as if any people kept in subjection by the sword (as it
is intended that all of us shall be hereafter) --- could be said to have any
country. This, too, they call "Preserving our Glorious Union"; as if there could
be said to be any Union, glorious or inglorious, that was not voluntary. Or as
if there could be said to be any union between masters and slaves; between those
who conquer, and those who are subjugated. All these cries of having "abolished
slavery," of having "saved the country," of having "preserved the union," of
establishing "a government of consent," and of "maintaining the national honor,"
are all gross, shameless, transparent cheats --- so transparent that they ought
to deceive no one --- when uttered as justifications for the war, or for the
government that has succeeded the war, or for now compelling the people to pay
the cost of the war, or for compelling anybody to support a government that he
does not want.

The lesson taught by all these facts is this: As long as mankind continue to
pay "National Debts," so-called --- that is, so long as they are such dupes and
cowards as to pay for being cheated, plundered, enslaved, and murdered --- so
long there will be enough to lend the money for those purposes; and with that
[*59] money a plenty of tools, called soldiers, can be hired to keep them in
subjection. But when they refuse any longer to pay for being thus cheated,
plundered, enslaved, and murdered, they will cease to have cheats, and usurpers,
and robbers, and murderers and blood-money loan-mongers for masters.

APPENDIX.

Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by anybody, as
a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now binding upon nobody;
and is, moreover, such an one as no people can ever hereafter be expected to
consent to, except as they may be forced to do so at the point of the bayonet,
it is perhaps of no importance what its true legal meaning, as a contract, is.
Nevertheless, the writer thinks it proper to say that, in his opinion, the
Constitution is no such instrument as it has generally been assumed to be; but
that by false interpretations, and naked usurpations, the government has been
made in practice a very widely, and almost wholly, different thing from what the
Constitution itself purports to authorize. He has heretofore written much, and
could write much more, to prove that such is the truth. But whether the
Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain --- that it
has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to
prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist.

NOTES

See "No Treason, No. 2" pages 5 and 6.

Suppose it be "the best government on earth," does that prove its own
goodness, or only the badness of all other governments?

The very men who drafted it, never signed it in any way to bind
themselves by it, as a contract. And not one of them probably ever would have
signed it in any way to bind himself by it, as a contract.

I have personally examined the statute books of the following States,
viz.: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio,
Michagan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas, Nveada, California, and Oregon, and find that in
all these States the English statute has been re-enacted, sometimes with
modifications, but generally enlarging its operations, and is now in
force.

The following are some of the provisions of the Massachusetts statute:

"No action shall be brought in any of the following cases, that is to
say:

. . . .

"To charge a person upon a special promise to answer for a debt, default, or
misdoings of another: . . . .

"Upon a contract for the sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or of any
interest in, or concerning them; or

"Upon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the
writing thereof:

"Unless the promise, contract, or agreement, upon which such action is
broughtm or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized: . . . .

"No contract for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, for the price of
fifty dollars or more, shall be good and valid, unless the purchaser accepts and
receives part of the goods so sold, or gives something in earnest to bind the
bargain, or in part payment; or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the
bargain is made and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by some person
thereunto by him lawfully authorized."

And this two-thirds vote may be but two-thirds of a quorum --- that is
two-thirds of a majority --- instead of two-thirds of the whole.

Of what appreciable value is it to any man, as an individual, that he is
allowed a voice in choosing these public masters? His voice is only one of
several millions.

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Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown
University Law Center

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